The United States has begun the most significant reduction of its Middle East military footprint since it began building its regional presence after the 1991 Gulf War. The Pentagon has reduced total US forces in the region from a peak of 85,000 in 2007 to approximately 35,000 today, with further reductions planned as the strategic focus shifts toward the Indo-Pacific.
The context is two decades of painful reckoning. The Iraq War cost the United States $2 trillion, resulted in 4,500 American military deaths, and ultimately did not achieve its stability objectives. The Afghanistan War cost another $2.3 trillion and ended with the Taliban returning to power within weeks of the US withdrawal. The accumulated cost of the post-9/11 wars is now estimated at $8 trillion when long-term veteran care and interest on war debt is included.
The reorientation is driven by a bipartisan recognition that the US military's most important adversary is China, and that resources and attention dedicated to the Middle East are resources not available for Pacific deterrence. General Mark Milley, before his retirement, summarized it: "We spent 20 years fighting wars that did not build toward our most important strategic challenge."
The consequences of reduced US presence are visible. Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon has increased. Gulf states are hedging between the US and China. And the Abraham Accords have stalled without the intensive US diplomatic engagement that produced them.