The Abraham Accords β the US-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco β reached their second anniversary with a balance sheet that is more positive than many observers expected but more limited than the agreements' most enthusiastic proponents promised.
The most durable achievement is economic. Israel-UAE trade has grown from essentially zero to $2.3 billion annually in two years. Direct flights between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi now operate multiple times daily. UAE companies have invested in Israeli technology startups. Israeli tourists have discovered Emirati luxury hospitality. The economic integration is genuine and self-reinforcing.
Security cooperation has also deepened. Israel and UAE air forces have conducted joint exercises. Intelligence sharing on Iranian activities has expanded. And the informal anti-Iran security architecture that the accords helped formalize has proven useful in coordinating responses to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
The limits are equally real. The accords explicitly set aside the Palestinian issue, which remains unresolved and which large portions of Arab public opinion will not allow their governments to permanently ignore. The Gaza war strained the accords significantly, with UAE and Bahraini governments facing domestic pressure to distance themselves from Israel. Saudi normalization β the diplomatic holy grail β remains elusive, suspended by the Gaza conflict.
